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State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texaco
Exploration & Production, Inc.: Favoring the Drafting
Party?*
I. Introduction
The methods by which taxpayers and the Oklahoma Tax Commission
calculate the gross production tax on severed gas is a major concern for
Oklahoma, which had the second highest volume of marketed production of
natural gas of all states in the United States in 2004,1 and is thus heavily
dependent upon gross production taxes as a source of revenue.  Proceeds from
the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code for severed gas are split among: (1)
the General Revenue Fund, for general expense use by the state government
as appropriated by the legislature; (2) the County Highway Fund, for
disbursement to each county in proportionate share to the total value of
production from each county; and (3) each county, in proportionate share to
the total value of production from each county, for apportionment amongst the
school districts in that county.2  In the fiscal year ending in 2004, the
Oklahoma Tax Commission collected $553,222,787.10 from the severance tax
on gas and apportioned $443,689,240.47 to the General Revenue Fund —
10.0% of the total taxes apportioned to the General Revenue Fund;
$36,956,849.93 to the County Highway Fund — 18.6% of the total taxes
apportioned to the County Highway Fund; and $36,956,849.93 to the budgets
of school districts — 13.0% of the total taxes apportioned to the budgets of
school districts.3
Given the importance of this source of revenues, one might presume that the
Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code is sophisticated and clear.
Unfortunately, individual circumstances indicate that this is not the case.
Because of the prevalence of major companies acting as both gas producers
and gas purchasers in the industry, the gas producer and initial purchaser may
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
856 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:855
4. See generally HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS
TERMS 602 (11th ed. 2000) (A major company is “[a] company integrated to a substantial
degree, that is, engaged in production, refining, transportation, and marketing.”).
5. See Owen L. Anderson, Self or Affiliate Gas Processing: Howell v. Texaco, Inc., 42
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. J. 331, 332 n.5, 355 (2005).
6. See 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1001(B)(4), 1009(F), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, ch.
134, §§ 2-3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws 545, 546-47, 557-58; id. § 1010(B)(5).
7. See id. § 1009(F), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 557-
58.
8. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 710:45-1-2 (1996) (“‘Gross value of the production’ means the
gross proceeds realized from the first sale of such production, including the actual cash value
and all premiums otherwise given to or reserved for the producer and all interest owners of such
production, without any deduction for costs whatsoever.”).
9. 2005 OK 52, 131 P.3d 705.
be related entities not dealing at arm’s-length.4  Alternatively, a producer may
retain title to produced gas without making an arm’s-length sale until the gas
has been moved far downstream and after the gas is processed for the removal
of valuable natural gas liquids.5  In either circumstance, the provisions of the
Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code fail to adequately define the method by
which the Oklahoma Tax Commission may curb potential abuse by a producer
and purchaser who, through a loophole in the statutes, may work in concert to
lower the basis on which gross production taxes are calculated on severed gas
and fail to adequately provide guidance to taxpayers who try to comply with
the gross production tax laws.6
Because the only portion of the statutes that contemplates these situations
does not provide concrete guidance for enforcement by the Oklahoma Tax
Commission or compliance by gas producers and purchasers,7 and the
definition of “gross value of the production” contained in the Oklahoma Tax
Commission Rules does not assist in resolving this issue,8 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court must supply the proper interpretation.  The court attempted to
address these concerns in State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texaco
Exploration & Production, Inc. (Texaco).9  This note argues that the Texaco
court correctly determined available alternative valuation methods for tax
purposes but incorrectly interpreted the application of the alternative valuation
methods in favor of the state — the party who must take accountability for the
language of the tax statutes as the drafting party.
Part II of this note discusses the pre-Texaco background of gross production
taxation law and gas valuation law for both gross production tax and royalty
purposes.  Part III provides the factual and procedural background of Texaco,
along with a summary of the opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Finally, Part IV details why the Texaco court correctly determined available
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10. See 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1001, amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 2, 2006 Okla. Sess.
Laws at 546-56; Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1973 OK 34, ¶ 18, 509 P.2d
109, 113-14; Noram Energy Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1995 OK CIV APP 149, ¶ 22, 935
P.2d 389, 395.
11. See 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1001(R), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 2, 2006 Okla. Sess.
Laws at 556; Mitch Kunce & William E. Morgan, Taxation of Oil and Gas in the United States
1970-1997, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 77, 91 (2005).
12. In re Gross Prod. Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., 1915 OK 792, ¶ 7, 154 P. 362, 365,
overruled by In re Skelton Lead & Zinc Co.’s Gross Prod. Tax for 1919, 1921 OK 121, ¶ 2, 197
P. 495, 498, and Bergin Oil & Gas Co. v. Howard, 1921 OK 240, ¶ 1, 199 P. 209, overruled by
Apache, ¶¶ 18-23, 509 P.2d at 113-15.
13. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sun Oil Co., 1971 OK 100, ¶¶ 10-12, 489 P.2d 1078, 1081
(deciding what constituted “production” of natural gas); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. State, 1935
OK 1210, ¶ 12, 53 P.2d 221, 223 (deciding what constituted “production” of oil).
14. State v. Indian Royalty Co., 1936 OK 366, ¶ 4, 58 P.2d 601, 602.
alternative valuation methods for tax purposes but incorrectly interpreted the
application of the alternative valuation methods in favor of the state.
II. The Landscape of Gross Production Taxation and Gas Valuation Law
Before Texaco
Overviews of three areas of Oklahoma law are important to an analysis of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc.: the law of gross
production taxation, the law of gas valuation for gross production tax
purposes, and the law of gas valuation for royalty purposes.
A. The Law of Gross Production Taxation
Oklahoma levies a severance tax based on the gross valuation of oil and gas
production in lieu of an ad valorem property tax.10  Thus, Oklahoma does not
levy a property tax on oil and gas reserves not yet produced.11  As the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f there [has been] no production . . .
no tax is authorized” under the Oklahoma gross production tax statutes.12  For
gross production tax purposes, Oklahoma courts have considered oil and gas
“produced” when the minerals are brought to the surface and confined,
allowing the measurement of its quantity and the testing of its quality and
value.13  The purpose of Oklahoma’s gross production tax on minerals is to
“provid[e] a more efficient and expeditious method of levying and collecting
a property tax upon the minerals, the property used in connection with the
production thereof, the leasehold estate, and all interests inherent in the right
to said minerals.”14  Rather than being a tax on real property, the gross
production tax is a tax levied on oil and gas after severance and thus as
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15. See Apache, ¶ 18, 509 P.2d at 113-14; Noram, ¶ 22, 935 P.2d at 395.
16. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1009(D), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 3, 2006 Okla. Sess.
Laws at 557.
17. Exxon Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1993 OK CIV APP 178, ¶ 7, 873 P.2d 306, 309.
18. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1001(B)(4), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 2, 2006 Okla. Sess.
Laws at 546-47.
19. Id. § 1010(B).
20. Id. § 1009(F), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Law at 557-58.
personal property.15  When the producer sells oil and gas at the time of
production, the purchaser pays the gross production tax by deducting the
amount of the tax from the producer’s first-sales proceeds.16  This procedure
differs from a sales tax, where the tax is collected and paid by the seller by
adding the amount of the tax to the sales price.17
B. The Law of Gas Valuation for Gross Production Tax Purposes
Title 68, sections 1001(B)(4), 1009(f), and 1010(B)(5) of the Oklahoma
Statutes address the valuation of the gross production of gas.  Oklahoma
assesses taxes levied upon natural gas production on the “gross value of the
production of gas.”18  Oklahoma requires “every person responsible for paying
or remitting the tax levied” by these statutes to report “[t]he total value of the
mineral oil, gas, or casinghead gas, at the time and place of production,
including any and all premiums paid for the sale thereof, at the price paid, if
purchased at the time of production” to the Oklahoma Tax Commission.19
Section 1009(F) permits the Oklahoma Tax Commission to “require the said
tax to be paid upon the basis of the prevailing price then being paid at the time
of production in said field for oil or gas of like kind, quality and character” if
“oil or gas is sold under circumstances where the sale price does not represent
the cash price prevailing for oil or gas of like kind, character or quality in the
field from which such product is produced.”20
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted the “gross value of the
production of gas” for gross production tax purposes as:
[T]he gross proceeds realized by each producer from his individual
sales contracts, except where the conditions under which a
particular contract was entered into were such as not to reflect
arm’s length bargaining or as not to be a reasonably prudent
exercise of such bargaining, resulting in an improper burden upon
the public revenue by a price not representing “gross value of the
production of natural gas.”  Where the Commission finds such
exceptions to exist, it should make a proper adjustment of the tax
to conform to the “prevailing price in the field at the time of
production.”  The “field” . . . . should be equated with “common
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21. Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1973 OK 34, ¶ 27, 509 P.2d 109, 116.
22. Id. ¶ 13, 509 P.2d at 113.
23. See 3 EUGENE O. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 38.1, 40.1-40.4
at 255-56, 311-48 (1989); JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 44 (4th ed. 2003).
24. See LOWE, supra note 23, at 279.
25. Katschor v. Eason Oil Co., 1936 OK 705, ¶ 30, 63 P.2d 977, 981.
26. Johnson v. Jernigan, 1970 OK 180, ¶ 5, 475 P.2d 396, 398.
27. Howell v. Texaco, Inc., 2004 OK 92, ¶¶ 18-20, 112 P.3d 1154, 1159.
28. Id. ¶ 18, 112 P.3d at 1159.
29. Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 1981 OK 65, ¶ 14, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273.
30. See Howell, ¶¶ 19-20, 112 P.3d at 1159.
source of supply” as that term is used and understood in the oil and
gas industry.21
The Oklahoma Tax Commission may invoke the “prevailing price in the field
at the time of production” means of determining tax “ONLY in cases where
the prices (already) paid are less than the prices that prevailed in the field at the
time said sale prices were contracted for.”22
C. The Law of Gas Valuation for Royalty Purposes
The terms of the oil and gas lease executed between the lessor and the lessee
determine the valuation of gross production of gas for royalty purposes.23  A
common term used to describe the value of gas in a typical lease royalty clause
is “market value at the well.”24  Oklahoma courts have generally held the term
“market value” as synonymous with actual value.25  Thus, market value
represents the sales price negotiated between willing, nonobligated buyers and
sellers in a free and open market.26
Three basic methods of determining the “market value at the well” exist: the
actual arm’s-length sale method, the prevailing market price method, and the
work-back method.27  The preferred method is the actual arm’s-length sale
method.28  Explaining this preferred method, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated:
[W]hen a producer’s lease calls for royalty on gas based on the
market price at the well and the producer enters into an arm’s-
length, good faith gas purchase contract [including long-term
contracts] with the best price and terms available to the producer at
the time, that price is the “market price” and will discharge the
producer’s gas royalty obligation.29
Producer-lessees and royalty owner-lessors use the other two methods in the
absence of an actual arm’s-length sale at the well.30
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31. LOWE, supra note 23, at 280.
32. See Johnson v. Jernigan, 1970 OK 180, ¶ 9, 475 P.2d 396, 398 (acknowledging that
lessees must often build a pipeline from their well or transport the gas through other lines to the
pipeline of a gas purchaser to create any market for their gas); LOWE, supra note 23, at 281
(recognizing gas is not always sold to an unrelated third party at the well, but often sold
“downstream” from the well).
33. Howell, ¶ 19, 112 P.3d at 1159 (citing Cimarron Utils. Co. v. Safranko, 1940 OK 181,
¶ 0, 101 P.2d 258, 259 (syllabus 1 by the court)).
34. Id. (citing Johnson, ¶ 5, 475 P.2d at 398).
35. Id. ¶ 20, 112 P.3d at 1159 (citing Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 1992 OK 100, ¶ 9 n.1, 854
P.2d 880, 882 n.1; Katschor v. Eason Oil Co., 1936 OK 705, ¶¶ 0, 32, 63 P.2d 977, 977
(syllabus 4 by the court), 981).
36. Id. (citing Katschor, ¶¶ 0, 32, 63 P.2d at 977 (syllabus 4 by the court), 981).
37. Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, ¶ 2, 954 P.2d 1203, 1205.
38. Id.
39. Johnson, ¶ 14, 475 P.2d at 399.
Because of the economic impracitability of storing gas at the well,31
establishing a hypothetical “market value at the well” often leads to disputes
over proper gross production valuation for royalty computations when the
producer must construct gathering lines and feeder lines to transport the gas
to a major gas transmission line and perhaps even move the gas through the
transmission line to the actual point of sale.32  When the producer cannot prove
“market value at the well” by an actual arm’s-length sale, the producer may
use evidence of the prevailing market price to establish the market value.33
Evidence which may prove the prevailing market price can include any arm’s-
length wellhead sales or purchase offers from the same well or arm’s-length
wellhead sales from other wells in the vicinity which are close in time to the
transaction not completed at arm’s length.34
Absent an actual arm’s-length sale at the well, producers often establish the
market value by using the work-back method,35 under which “the market value
at the wellhead is calculated by subtracting allowable costs and expenses[, if
any,] from the first downstream, arm’s-length sale.”36  If the producer can
show that the gas was marketable at the wellhead and reasonable post-
production costs increased the actual royalty revenues proportionately, these
costs constitute allowable deductions from the royalty payment calculations
under the work-back method.37  Allowable post-production costs for deduction
include transportation, compression, dehydration and blending costs if those
costs are reasonable, “the costs enhanced the value of an already marketable
product,” and “actual royalty revenues increased in proportion with the costs
assessed.”38  Because royalty owners have a right to be paid based on the
“highest possible market value,”39 they are also “entitled to have their royalty
payments based on the prevailing market price or the work-back method,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/5
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40. Howell, ¶ 22, 112 P.3d at 1160.
41. Id.
42. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 266 U.S. 298 (1924) (acknowledging that gross production
taxes are governed by statutes imposing the tax and must be computed in accordance with those
statutes); see also supra Part II.B.
43. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 2005 OK 52, ¶
2, 131 P.3d 705, 707.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. ¶ 3, 131 P.3d at 707.
47. Id.
whichever one results in the higher market value.”40  Additionally, producers
cannot use contracts for intra-company gas sales as the basis for the valuation
of gas for royalty purposes.41  
Essentially, the valuation of gas for royalty purposes is derived from
contract terms and their interpretation, whereas the valuation of gas for
taxation purposes is derived from state statutes and their interpretation.42
When the contract terms of the oil and gas lease or the language of the gross
production tax statutes do not fully address gas valuation courts must decide
how to interpret the problem within both arenas of the law.  In Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc., the Oklahoma
Supreme Court interpreted the gas valuation problem that occurs in the
absence of an arm’s-length transaction at the wellhead, as contemplated by the
provisions of the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code.
III. Statement of the Case: State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc.
In 2002, the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC) filed suit against Texaco
Exploration & Production, Inc. and Texaco Inc. (collectively Texaco) in
district court in Stephens County, alleging that Texaco had intentionally
evaded taxes by devising and implementing “a scheme to calculate gross
production and petroleum excise taxes on a price less than the fair market
value.”43  The OTC sought damages for gross production and petroleum excise
taxes, together with interest and penalties, totaling at least $20 million.44
Texaco denied the allegations and set forth nineteen affirmative defenses.45
A. Statement of Facts Giving Rise to the Dispute
Texaco produced gas from wells in Stephens County.46  Texaco gathered the
gas it produced with its own gathering system, processed the gas at its own
processing plant, and sold residue gas at the tailgate of the plant to third
parties.47  In addition, “Texaco . . . gathered and processed gas purchased from
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶ 4, 131 P.3d at 707 (urging the use of 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1001 (2001) and OKLA.
ADMIN. CODE § 710:45-1-2 (1996)).
53. Id. (urging the use of 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1001, 1009).
54. See id. ¶ 5, 131 P.3d at 707.
55. Id.
56. Id.
other producers in the field under wellhead gas purchase contracts for a
percentage of the proceeds received at the tailgate of the plant.”48  Based on the
price of those percentage-of-proceeds gas purchase contracts, Texaco executed
a written contract with itself for purchase of its own gas.49  Texaco based its
gross production of gas taxes contained in its reports to the OTC on a
percentage of the proceeds it received at the tailgate of the plant under these
contracts.50
B. The Holding of the Stephens County District Court
Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the proper
method for determining the value of the gas for purposes of calculating gross
production tax absent an arm’s-length wellhead sale.51  The OTC took the
position that the gross production tax statutes and applicable OTC rules
“require[d] Texaco to pay taxes based on the gross proceeds realized from the
first arm’s length purchase of the gas.”52  In contrast, Texaco argued that it had
complied with the gross production tax statutes and “correctly paid the taxes
on the production based on the prevailing price established by the comparable
sales prices paid under the percent of proceeds contracts for wellhead sale of
gas of like kind, quality and character in the same field.”53
Agreeing with Texaco’s argument, the district court granted its motion for
partial summary judgment.54  The court “concluded that ‘in the absence of
individual sales contracts, negotiated under circumstances that reflect arm’s
length bargaining, . . . gross value of gas produced is best reflected by the
prevailing price in the field for gas of similar kind, quality and character at the
time of production.’”55  The district court reserved judgment on determining
the prevailing price because the facts necessary to resolve that issue remained
in dispute.56
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57. Id. ¶ 6, 131 P.3d at 707.
58. Id. ¶ 7, 131 P.3d at 707.
59. 1973 OK 34, 509 P.2d 109.
60. Texaco, ¶ 18, 131 P.3d at 710.
61. Id. ¶ 20, 131 P.3d at 710 (citing 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1001(B)(4), 1010(B)(5) (2001));
see also supra Part II.B.
62. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1009(F) (Supp. 2005), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, ch. 134,
§ 3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws 545, 557-58.
63. Texaco, ¶ 20, 131 P.3d at 710; see also supra Part II.B.
64. Texaco, ¶ 23, 131 P.3d at 711.
65. Id.
66. 2004 OK 92, 112 P.3d 1154.
67. Texaco, ¶ 24, 131 P.3d at 711.
C. The Opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted the OTC’s petition for writ of
certiorari to review the partial summary judgment of the district court.57  As a
threshold matter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that “the basis for
determining gross value of gas for taxation purposes must be found in the
gross production tax statutes” because, as an exclusively legislative function,
the authority for and proper implementation of taxation must come from
statutory language.58  Citing Apache Gas Products Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission,59 the court stated that the required standard for computation of
gross production taxes is the price paid for gas at the wellhead in an actual
arm’s-length transaction between the producer and the purchaser.60
The court also acknowledged that the relevant portions of the gross
production tax code levy severance taxes on the gross value of the gas
production at the time and place of production.61  The statutes, however,
permit the OTC to adjust the basis for the tax to “the prevailing price then
being paid at the time of production in said field for oil or gas of like kind,
quality and character”62 if the sales price is not an accurate representation of
prevailing market prices.63
The court deduced that when the producer’s individual sales contracts are
the result of reasonably prudent arm’s-length bargaining, the taxpayer and the
OTC should calculate gross production tax on the gross proceeds realized by
those contracts.64  When the producer’s sales contracts do not exhibit arm’s-
length bargaining, such as Texaco’s contracts with itself in this case, the
taxpayer and the OTC should calculate the gross production tax “on the
prevailing price in the field at the time of production” in accordance with title
68, section 1009(F) of the Oklahoma Statutes.65  In an effort to define the
proper alternative methods of valuation, the court applied its holding in Howell
v. Texaco, Inc.66 to Texaco.67
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68. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 131 P.3d at 711.
69. Id. ¶ 25, 131 P.3d at 711.
70. Id. ¶ 26, 131 P.3d at 711.
71. Id. (citing 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1001(C), 1009(d) (2001)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
The Howell court, in deciding the appropriate gas valuation method for
purposes of royalty payments in the same absence of an arm’s-length sale at
the wellhead, recognized three suitable methods of establishing market value
of gas at the wellhead:
1) the actual sale price paid through arm’s length negotiation; and,
in the absence of an arm’s length wellhead purchase, 2) the
prevailing market value method, and 3) the work-back method
whereby the market value at the wellhead is calculated by
subtracting allowable costs and expenses from the proceeds of the
first downstream, arm’s length sale.68
When choosing between the latter two methods because of the absence of an
actual arm’s-length wellhead purchase, the Howell court concluded that
producers must use the higher of the two methods for calculations of royalty
payments.69
In the instant case, the court determined that the Howell methods for
establishing wellhead value of gas “fall within the comprehensive language
used in the pertinent gross production tax statutes” and found that the OTC had
already effectively used them in other administrative assessment processes.70
The court also noted that “other provisions in these statutes contemplate that
the purchaser will report and pay the gross production tax based on the price
it paid to the producer and the royalty owners.”71
Based on the reasoning of Apache, the court held that taxpayers and the
OTC were to use the methods adopted by Howell in the royalty context for
purposes of determining gross production tax.72  Specifically, the court stated
“that in the absence of an actual arm’s length sale at the wellhead, gross value
of gas for calculation of gross production taxes is to be determined by using
the prevailing price method or the work-back method . . . whichever results in
the higher value.”73  Furthermore, the court held that Texaco’s contract with
itself could not act as the source of gas valuation for calculating gross
production taxes.74
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75. Howell v. Texaco, Inc., 2004 OK 92, 112 P.3d 1154.
76. Compare id., with Texaco, 2005 OK 52, 131 P.3d 705.
77. See Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1998 OK 7, ¶ 23, 954 P.2d 1203, 1209;
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sun Oil Co., 1971 OK 100, ¶ 13, 489 P.2d 1078, 1081.
78. Mittelstaedt, ¶ 23, 954 P.2d at 1209.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Texaco, ¶ 24, 131 P.3d at 711.
81. See Mittelstaedt, ¶ 23, 954 P.2d at 1209; Sun Oil, ¶ 13, 489 P.2d at 1081.
IV. Analysis: Favoring the Drafting Party?
Perhaps in an effort to achieve uniformity of gas valuation measures, the
Texaco court too hastily applied the recent royalty decision in Howell v.
Texaco75 directly to the arena of gross production taxation.  Even though the
issue at the heart of the dispute in Texaco was the proper interpretation of the
language of Oklahoma’s gross production tax provisions, the Texaco court
applied the holding of Howell — a case involving the interpretation of
contract-based lease provisions.76  In doing so, the Texaco court broke with
prior precedent acknowledging a difference between determining the value of
gas for gross production tax purposes and determining the value of gas for
royalty purposes.77
In fact, the Oklahoma Supreme Court “has observed that a term used for the
purpose of calculating a tax may have a different meaning in calculating a
royalty.”78  Furthermore, “this Court . . . [has] explain[ed] that the value of gas
for the purpose of the gross production tax was not necessarily calculated in
the same manner as its value for the purpose of paying royalties.”79  While
acknowledging that the facts of Apache are “distinguishable” from those in
Texaco, the court’s only explanation for this break with precedent was that the
reasoning in Apache “supports application of Howell . . . in this case.”80
Because Howell was an interpretation of royalty obligations under oil and gas
lease terms, whereas Texaco was an interpretation of gross production tax
obligations under state statutes, the available precedent before the Texaco
court would seemingly prescribe that the reasoning in Apache supports the
ultimate determination of some, but not all, of the conclusions in Howell.81
Although this distinction may appear trivial, its effects are nevertheless
significant.
A. Adoption of the Howell Methods for Taxation Purposes
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision to adopt both alternative methods
of valuation for royalty purposes embraced in Howell — the prevailing market
value method and the work-back method — and to use them to establish gross
value of gas for gross production tax purposes is justifiable.  The court
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866 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:855
82. Texaco, ¶ 7, 131 P.3d at 707 (citing Gay v. Thomas, 1896 OK 67, 46 P. 578).
83. Samson Hydrocarbons Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1998 OK 82, ¶ 7, 976 P.2d 532, 535
(citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Switch, 1994 OK 59, ¶ 5, 878 P.2d 357, 359).
84. Id. ¶ 15, 976 P.2d at 537-38 (citing Ledbetter v. Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Laws
Enforcement Comm’n, 1988 OK 117, ¶ 7, 764 P.2d 172, 179).
85. Id. ¶ 7, 976 P.2d at 535 (quoting Anson Corp. v. Hill, 1992 OK 138, ¶ 10, 841 P.2d 583,
585).
86. Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 1963 OK 112, ¶ 11, 381 P.2d
844, 847).
87. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1001(B)(4) (Supp. 2005), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, ch. 134,
§ 2, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws 545, 546-47.
88. Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1973 OK 34, ¶¶ 16, 18, 27, 509 P.2d
109, 113-14, 116.
89. Id. ¶ 27, 509 P.2d at 116.
correctly observed that a basis for these alternative methods must exist within
the gross production tax statutes because any method of taxation —
exclusively a function of the legislature — must be prescribed by statute.82
Tax statutes are subject to the fundamental rule of statutory construction that
courts are to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the statute’s legislative
intent and purpose.83  To determine the intent of the legislature and allow the
practical application of statutes courts must construe statutes that relate to the
same subject matter together, giving full force and effect to each statute.84
Courts must assign words in a statute “the same meaning as that attributed to
them by ordinary and common definitions,” absent a contrary definition
provided by the statute itself.85  A presumption exists that courts should give
effect to every provision of a statute because the legislature intended some
useful purpose for every provision.86
The Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code provides that “there is hereby
levied upon the production of gas a tax . . . on the gross value of the
production of gas.”87  Because the Oklahoma legislature intended the gross
production tax to replace real property taxes for minerals, the purchase price
of gas upon production at the wellhead paid in an arm’s-length transaction
between the producer and the purchaser best represents the gross value of
production.88  Further interpretation of the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax
Code provides that when a wellhead transaction does not exist, the OTC
“should make a proper adjustment of the tax to conform to the ‘prevailing
price in the field at the time of production.’”89
At first reading of the language of section 1009(F), it appears that the
legislature intended to allow taxpayers and the OTC to use one of the
alternative valuation methods for royalty purposes affirmed in Howell — the
prevailing market value method — to determine valuation for gross production
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90. See 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1009(F) (Supp. 2005), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 3,
2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 557-58.
91. See Apache, ¶ 27, 509 P.2d at 116 (finding that, where the OTC finds that the individual
sales contracts do not reflect arm’s-length bargaining, “it should make a proper adjustment of
the tax to conform to the ‘prevailing price in the field at the time of production,’” and remaining
correspondingly silent towards the work-back method); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sun Oil Co.,
1971 OK 100, ¶¶ 12-13, 489 P.2d 1078, 1081 (referring to the prevailing market value method
as the litmus test for determining if the value of gas expressed in a gas sales contract was the
appropriate value under the gross production tax statutes and rejecting the work-back method
as a method “to be used in determining royalty to be paid, not . . . in determinging [sic] the
amount of gross production tax due”).  The Texaco court inappropriately dismissed the
relevance of Sun Oil to its holding, finding that Sun Oil “turned on the statutory language
imposing the tax at the time and place of production in § 1001” and “did not construe the
statutory provisions applicable herein.”  State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Texaco Exploration
& Prod., Inc., 2005 OK 52, ¶ 21, 131 P.3d 705, 710.  The court’s determination to dismiss the
relevance of Sun Oil is contrary to the holding of Texaco, which finds this same
“comprehensive” statutory language, codified in sections 1001(B)(4) and 1010(B)(5) of the
Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code, as reason to adopt the alternative valuation methods
under the Tax Code.  Id. ¶¶ 20, 26, 131 P.3d at 710-11.  “In order to ascertain the intention of
the Legislature in the enactment of [a statute], the court may look to each part of the statute
[and] to other statutes upon the same or relative subjects.”  Blevins v. W. A. Graham Co., 1919
OK 147, ¶ 8, 182 P. 247, 248.  “[W]hen two statutes covering in whole or in part the same
matter are not absolutely irreconcilable, effect should be given, if possible, to both of them.”
Carpenter v. Russell, 1903 OK 66, ¶ 7, 73 P. 930, 932 (quoting United States v. Greathouse, 166
U.S. 601, 605 (1897)).  “Different statutes on the same subject are generally to be viewed as in
pari materia and must be construed as a harmonious whole.”  Taylor v. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Co., 1999 OK 44, ¶ 19, 981 P.2d 1253, 1261 (citing State ex rel. Marland v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 1941 OK 66, ¶ 32, 118 P.2d 621, 625 (“The general rule is that statutes in pari
materia are those which relate to the same person or thing or to the same classes of persons or
things or which have a common purpose; that in the construction of a particular statute, or in
the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same
general purpose should be read in connection with it as together constituting one law.”)).
Certainly, the precedent laid down by the decision in Sun Oil construing the same
“comprehensive” language of the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code at the heart of the
Texaco court’s decision is applicable to the court’s interpretation of the legislative intent of the
Tax Code and highly instructive on the matter.
tax purposes.90  In fact, language in both Apache and Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sun Oil Co. indicates that this may be the only alternative
valuation method available to taxpayers and the OTC in the absence of an
actual arm’s-length transaction.91  When reading sections 1001(B)(4), 1009(F),
and 1010(B)(5) together and giving full force and effect to each statute as one
must, however, these provisions seem to express the legislature’s intent to
make available to taxpayers and the OTC all reasonable alternative valuation
methods in the absence of an actual arm’s-length transaction.  A determination
that only the prevailing market value method, and not the work-back method,
would be available to taxpayers and the OTC in the absence of an actual
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92. See supra Part IV.A.
93. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 346.
94. See 2 KUNTZ, supra note 23, §§ 18.2, 19.10, at 4-6, 33-38.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
96. Samson Hydrocarbons Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1998 OK 82, ¶ 8, 976 P.2d 532, 536
(citing Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1996 OK 39, ¶ 10, 913 P.2d
1322, 1327; Strelecki v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1993 OK 122, ¶ 20, 872 P.2d 910, 920; Wilson
v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1979 OK 62, ¶ 5, 594 P.2d 1210, 1212).
97. Howell v. Texaco, Inc., 2004 OK 92, ¶ 22, 112 P.3d 1154, 1160 (citing Johnson v.
Jernigan, 1970 OK 180, ¶ 14, 475 P.2d 396, 399).
arm’s-length transaction would render section 1009(F) null and void if no
suitable arm’s-length sales from the same or nearby wells close in time to the
transaction at issue were available to use under the prevailing market value
method.  Therefore, the Texaco court justifiably determined that both
alternative valuation methods were authorized by the Oklahoma Gross
Production Tax Code.
B. Adoption of the Highest Alternative Method
1. The Oklahoma Supreme Court Favors the Drafting Party
Although the court correctly determined that the statutes authorized
taxpayers and the OTC to use both alternative valuation methods to establish
the prevailing price for purposes of gross production taxation, the express
language of both section 1009(F) and the decisions in Apache and Sun Oil
discussed above indicate a clear preference for the prevailing market value
method,92 which generally produces a lower valuation figure than the work-
back method.93  Therefore, the Texaco court’s determination that taxpayers and
the OTC should determine a taxpayer’s obligation based on the alternative
method producing the higher result, without express statutory language
indicating as much, was not justifiable.  A fundamental tenet of oil and gas law
is that because oil and gas leases are essentially contracts as well as
conveyances, contractual rules of construction apply.94  Courts construe any
doubt as to the contract’s meaning against the party who supplied the language
of the contract.95  Likewise, because courts strictly construe tax statutes, such
as the gross production tax statutes, against the state as the drafting party,
“[a]ny ambiguity or doubt as to a tax statute’s meaning must be resolved in
favor of the taxpayer.”96
The Howell court correctly deduced that when no arm’s-length sale at the
wellhead is at hand and the parties must use one of the alternative methods to
determine the valuation of gas for royalty purposes, the parties should use the
higher of the two methods because “[a] royalty owner has a right to be paid on
the best price available.”97  Because oil and gas leases are contracts executed
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103. See id. ¶ 22, 112 P.3d at 1160.
104. See Samson Hydrocarbons Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1998 OK 82, ¶ 8, 976 P.2d 532,
536 (citing Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1996 OK 39, ¶ 10, 913 P.2d
1322, 1327; Strelecki v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1993 OK 122, ¶ 20, 872 P.2d 910, 920; Wilson
v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1979 OK 62, ¶ 5, 594 P.2d 1210, 1212); see also supra text
accompanying note 96.
105. See supra Part IV.A.
106. See Samson, ¶ 8, 976 P.2d at 536 (citing Globe Life, ¶ 10, 913 P.2d at 1327; Strelecki,
¶ 20, 872 P.2d at 920; Wilson, ¶ 5, 594 P.2d at 1212).
107. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 2005 OK 52, ¶
26, 131 P.3d 705, 711.
between lessors as royalty owners and lessees as gas producers, courts must
enforce the leases according to the parties’ intentions as expressed within the
lease.98  To ascertain the parties’ intent, courts rely upon rules of construction
of contracts to interpret oil and gas leases.99  When interpreting oil and gas
leases, courts apply the well-established rule that language in the leases should
be construed strictly against the lessee and in favor of the lessor,100 at least
where the lessee provided the lease form — the common occurrence.101
“Market value leases,” such as the leases at issue in Howell, contain lease
royalty clauses that require lessees to pay a royalty based upon the market
value of gas at the wellhead.102  Interpreting the phrase “market value” in the
royalty clauses in accord with the preceding rule of construction, the Howell
court correctly determined that the alternative method resulting in the highest
“market value” is the proper method for ascertaining the value of gas for
royalty purposes.103
Applying essentially the same statutory rule of construction to the gross
production tax statutes, however, requires that courts construe the tax statutes
in favor of the taxpayer as the nondrafting party.104  Although both alternative
valuation methods should be available to taxpayers and the OTC in the
absence of an arm’s-length transaction at the wellhead,105 the value of the gas
subject to the gross production tax statutes should not be the higher of the
alternative valuation methods absent statutory language authorizing this
result.106  By interpreting the language of the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax
Code to require taxpayers and the OTC to use higher of the two alternative
valuation methods, the Texaco court violated this well-established rule by
construing the statute in favor of the state — the drafting party.107
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108. Id. ¶ 7, 131 P.3d at 707 (citing Gay v. Thomas, 1896 OK 67, 46 P. 578).
109. Id. ¶ 26, 131 P.3d at 711 (emphasis added).
110. See 3 KUNTZ, supra note 23, § 40.4(a)-(b), at 322-27.
111. Texaco, ¶ 26 n.6, 131 P.3d at 711 n.6.
112. See 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1001(C), 1009(D) (Supp. 2005), amended by Act of May 10,
2006, ch. 134, §§ 2-3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws 545, 547, 557.
113. See id.
114. Id. § 1009(D), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 557;
Exxon Corp. v. Okla. Tax. Comm’n, 1993 OK CIV APP 178, ¶ 7, 873 P.2d 306, 309.
115. See 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1001(B)(4), (C), 1009(D) (Supp. 2005), amended by Act of
May 10, 2006, §§ 2-3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 546-47, 557.
Because any method of taxation must be prescribed by statute, a basis for
determining that courts should use the higher of the alternative methods must
exist within the gross production tax statutes.108  The Texaco court stated that
“other provisions in [the gross production tax] statutes contemplate that the
purchaser will report and pay the gross production tax based on the price it
paid to the producer and the royalty owners.”109  The court’s flawed reasoning
for this statement ignores the realities of the gas market.  In reality, purchasers
do not actually make payments to royalty owners; purchasers pay producers
who, in turn, pay royalty owners for their proportionate share of the production
under their lease because the common gas royalty provision places title to all
of the gas produced in the producer.110
In support of its flawed reasoning, the court stated that title 68, section
1009(D) of the Oklahoma Statutes “requires the purchaser of gas sold at the
time of production to withhold the gross production taxes in making
settlements with the producer and the royalty owner and report and pay the tax
to the OTC,” and that section 1001(C) “provides that the gross production tax
attaches to and is a lien upon the royalty interest.”111  The actual language of
sections 1001(C) and 1009(D), however, merely provides for the deduction of
the gross production taxes from both the producer’s portion and the royalty
owner’s portion of the production proceeds.112  Expressed differently, the
royalty owner’s portion of the production proceeds is not free from the gross
production taxes owed by the producer.113  The purchaser pays gross
production taxes by deducting from the producer’s first sales proceeds of the
minerals, rather than adding to the purchaser’s price of the minerals like a sales
tax.114  Therefore, the Gross Production Tax Code authorizes a purchaser to
deduct its gross production tax payments from its payments to producers and
ultimately, royalty interest owners, as they are the parties responsible for
payment of the gross production taxes.115  To suggest that sections 1001(C)
and 1009(D) “contemplate that the purchaser will report and pay the gross
production tax based on the price it paid to . . . the royalty owners” is simply
a misreading of those sections, which place the burden of gross production
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116. Texaco, ¶ 26, 131 P.3d at 711.
117. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 So. 2d 886 (Ala. 1992); Washington County Bd.
of Equalization v. Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d 146 (Colo. 2005).
118. Phillips, 638 So. 2d at 889.
119. Id. at 889-90.
120. Compare ALA. CODE § 40-20-2(a)(1) (1975) (“There is hereby levied . . . annual
privilege taxes upon every person . . . producing or severing . . . gas. . . .  The amount of such
tax shall be measured at the rate of eight percent of the gross value of said . . . gas at the point
of production.”), with 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1001(B)(4) (Supp. 2005) (“[T]here is hereby levied
upon the production of gas a tax . . . on the gross value of the production of gas.”), amended by
Act of May 10, 2006, § 2, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 546-47.
121. Compare ALA. CODE § 40-20-1(3) (“VALUE.  The sale price or market value at the
mouth of the well.”), with Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1973 OK 34, ¶ 27,
509 P.2d 109, 116 (holding that the value of gross production tax should first be based on the
sales price in arm’s-length transactions at the wellhead).
122. Compare ALA. CODE § 40-20-1(3) (“VALUE. . . .  [I]f there is no sale at the time of
severance or if the relation between the buyer and the seller is such that the consideration paid,
if any, is not indicative of the true value or market price, then the department shall determine
the value of the . . . gas subject to the tax hereinafter provided for, considering the sale price for
cash of . . . gas of like quality.”), with 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1009(F) (Supp. 2005) (“In case . . . gas
taxes on the producers and royalty interest owners.116  Accordingly, the Texaco
court erred when it determined that the taxpayers and the OTC must use the
greater of the alternative valuation methods to determine the valuation of gas
for tax purposes in the absence of an arm’s-length transaction at the wellhead.
2. Better Interpretations in Alabama and Colorado
An analysis of interpretations of valuation language in the Alabama and
Colorado gross production tax statutes supports this conclusion.117  The
Supreme Court of Alabama has determined that under the language of the
Alabama gross production tax statutes, the Alabama Department of Revenue
(Department) may assess the value of gas by either the prevailing market value
method or the work-back method in the absence of an arm’s length sale at the
wellhead.118  The court further noted the unfavorability of the work-back
method, and stated that any alternative method of valuation may be attacked
by the taxpayer as unrepresentative of “market value” through use of expert
testimony or evidence of other sales of like-quality gas.119
Alabama’s gross production tax statutes contain similar provisions to
Oklahoma’s gross production tax statutes.  Both states’ statutes impose a
severance tax based on the gross value of production of gas.120  In both states,
value is preferably determined by an arm’s-length sale at the wellhead.121
Likewise, both statutes provide similar authority for the use of alternative
methods of valuation in the absence of an arm’s-length transaction at the
wellhead.122
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is sold under circumstances where the sale price does not represent the cash price prevailing for
. . . gas of like kind, character or quality in the field from which such product is produced, the
Tax Commission may require the said tax to be paid upon the basis of the prevailing price then
being paid at the time of production in said field for . . . gas of like kind, quality and
character.”), amended by Act of May 10, 2006, § 3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws at 557-58.
123. Phillips, 638 So. 2d at 889.
124. Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 40-20-1(3)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 889-90.
127. Id. at 889.
128. See State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 2005 OK 52,
131 P.3d 705.
In State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the Alabama Supreme Court reasoned
that “the statute defines ‘value’ as ‘sale price or market value.’  Therefore, any
method of assessing ‘value,’ other than actual sale at the wellhead, must be
calculated to result in an amount approximating market value.”123  If an arm’s-
length sale at the wellhead does not exist, “‘then the department shall
determine the value’ of the raw gas, ‘considering the sale price for cash of . . .
gas of like quality.’”124  Because of the use of the word “considering,” the
Phillips court determined that this provision of the Alabama gross production
tax statute required the Department to “reasonably regard” the sale price of
like-quality gas — essentially, a valuation determination using the prevailing
market value method — but not to treat this evidence as dispositive.125
Therefore, the Phillips court concluded that Alabama’s gross production tax
statutes, which bear great similarities to Oklahoma’s gross production tax
statutes, permitted the Department to assess gross production taxes based on
either of the alternative valuation methods — the prevailing market value
method or the work-back method.126  The decision of the Phillips court,
however, differed from the decision of the Texaco court in two important
aspects.  First, the Phillips court allowed any taxpayer who believed the
selected valuation method overestimated or underestimated the “value” or
“market value” of the gross production of gas to challenge the assessment
through “expert testimony or . . . evidence of other sales of like-quality gas,”127
whereas the Texaco court was silent on this important point.128  Thus, the
question of whether a taxpayer may introduce expert testimony on the subject
of value if the taxpayer disagrees with the OTC’s valuation assessment
remains open in Oklahoma.  Second, the Phillips court identified the work-
back method as the “disfavored method” of calculating gas value and allowed
any taxpayer who believed that a value calculated by the Department using the
work-back method did not result in a fair indication of value to challenge the
assessment “by showing that the calculations improperly included or excluded
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129. Phillips, 638 So. 2d at 889-90.
130. Texaco, ¶ 26, 131 P.3d at 711.
131. See supra Parts IV intro., IV.B.
132. Washington County Bd. of Equalization v. Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d 146, 154 (Colo.
2005).
133.  29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
134. Petron, 109 P.3d at 154.
135. Id. (dictum) (quoting Rogers, 29 P.3d at 901).  The Petron court principally based its
holding — that the taxpayer properly deducted leasehold-site gathering and processing costs to
make the oil marketable from the downstream point of sale to determine the value of the
unprocessed material at the wellhead subject to taxation — on interpretations of language of
article X, section 3(1)(b) of the Colorado Constitution and section 39-7-101(1)(d) of the
Colorado Revised Statutes.  Id. at 149-54.
items.”129  In contrast, the Texaco court gave the prevailing market value
method and the work-back method equal footing in determining the
appropriate value of gas under similar gross production tax statute language.130
Given the language of the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code and the
precedent before the Texaco court tending to show that the prevailing market
value method was the preferred method for determining the value of gas
subject to the Tax Code,131 the Texaco court should have made a determination
about the unfavorability of the work-back method more similar to that of the
Phillips court.
The Supreme Court of Colorado recently acknowledged the distinction
urged by this note in interpreting provisions in oil and gas leases for royalty
purposes versus interpreting provisions in statutes for taxation purposes.132  In
Washington County Board of Equalization v. Petron, the court rejected the
county tax assessor’s argument attempting to analogize Rogers v. Westerman
Farm Co.,133 another recent decision by the Colorado Supreme Court that
disallowed the deduction of certain costs while using the work-back method
to determine valuation for royalty payments under oil and gas leases, to the
issue in Petron, which dealt with the ability to deduct these costs while using
the work-back method to determine valuation for state tax obligations under
the state tax statutes.134  The Petron court determined that although “oil and
gas leases are strictly construed against the lessee in favor of the lessor” in the
royalty context, the “benefit of the doubt goes to the taxpayer” in the taxation
context.135  Accordingly:
The analogy between Rogers and this case is misplaced.  Our
decision in Rogers addresses royalty obligations under private gas
leases.  We applied common law principles of interpretation to
contracts that were silent as to how the natural gas was to be valued
for purposes of calculating royalties. . . .
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Our analysis of the contract relating to the allocation of costs
incurred downstream of the physical wellhead between working
and royalty interest owners under the gas leases in Rogers is not
relevant in the context of the constitutional and statutory
interpretation applicable here.136
The Petron court’s determination that interpretations of royalty provisions
regarding valuation of gas under oil and gas leases do not apply to
interpretations of tax provisions regarding valuation of oil and gas under state
tax statutes should have been adopted by the Texaco court.  Instead, the
Texaco court chose to ignore the relevant precedent establishing that methods
of gas valuation for royalty purposes were not applicable to determining
methods of gas valuation for taxation purposes when the court applied the
royalty decision in Howell directly to the taxation issue in Texaco.137  Based
on the applicable rules of construction for contracts and statutes as explained
by the Petron court and the precedent before the Texaco court,138 the Texaco
court erred by applying the Howell decision absolutely to its taxation and
statutory interpretation decision.  The Texaco court should have held that the
prevailing market value method was the “favored” method for taxpayers and
the OTC to determine the value of gas in the absence of an actual arm’s-length
transaction at the wellhead under the Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code
and reserving the availability of the work-back method to taxpayers and the
OTC in circumstances where application of the prevailing market value
method is not possible.
V. Conclusion
The Oklahoma Gross Production Tax Code and prior precedent do not
contemplate that the value of gas for gross production tax purposes should be
calculated in the same manner as the value of gas for royalty purposes, as the
Oklahoma Supreme Court erroneously determined in State ex rel. Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc.  Courts should treat
taxpayers in the same manner as royalty interest owners with regard to the
valuation of gas under the language of the gross production tax statutes and
lease royalty clauses, respectively.  The well-established rule of construction
that courts should strictly construe the language against the drafting party
works against the gas producer as lessee of an oil and gas lease; however, the
rule should favor the gas producer as taxpayer under the gross production tax
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139. See Act of May 10, 2006, ch. 134, §§ 3, 5, 2006 Okla. Sess. Laws 545, 557-58.
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Addresses OTC v. Texaco Decision, WELLHEAD, May 2006, at 13, 13.
141. Act of May 10, 2006, ch. 134, § 3, 2006 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 547, 559-60.
statutes as dictated by precedent and reason.  The holding of the Texaco court
improperly ignores this rule and inappropriately gives equal force to the
alternative valuation methods.  Other gas producing jurisdictions have made
similar determinations; Oklahoma, as a leading gas producing state, should
have done the same.
VI. Addendum
On May 10, 2006, House Bill No. 2411 was approved and made substantial
changes to title 68, section 1009(F) of the Oklahoma Statutes effective July 1,
2006.139  This amendment prohibits the OTC from using the work-back
method by prescribing the use of the prevailing price method and “no other
basis” to value gas for the purpose of calculating gross production taxes.140
The amended statute also defines “related entities” and specifies a procedure
for valuation of gas for tax purposes when the sale is between related
entities.141  In its entirety, section 1009(F) now reads:
F. 1. In case oil or gas is sold under circumstances where the sale
price does not represent the cash price prevailing for oil or gas of
like kind, character or quality in the field from which such product
is produced, the Tax Commission may require the said tax to be
paid upon the basis of the prevailing price then being paid at the
time of production for sales in said field for oil or gas of like kind,
quality and character and on no other basis.
2. In the case where the sale of oil or gas is between related
entities, the taxpayer shall have the burden of proving with
evidence of arm’s-length sales between unrelated parties that the
sales price represents the cash price prevailing for oil or gas of like
kind, character or quality for sales in the field from which such
product is produced.  In the absence of such proof, the prevailing
price shall be presumed to be the average price of oil or gas
produced for sales in the county from which the product is
produced, as determinded by the Tax Commission from monthly tax
reports filed pursuant to Section 1010 of this title.  In determining
the average price, the Tax Commission shall not include the sales
of oil or gas under review and shall not include prices from other
sales that have been previously adjusted by the Tax Commission
pursuant to this subsection.
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142. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 1009(F) (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added to show changes).
3. For the purposes of this subsection, an entity is related to
another entity if:
a. the two entities have significant common purposes and
substantial common membership,
b. the two entites have direct or indirect substantial common
direction or control, or
c. either entity owns, directly or through one or more entities,
a fifty percent (50%) or greater interest in the capital or
profits of the other entity.142
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